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rational, slow, and controlled system of thought, where we
reason through our options. (For more about these systems of
thought, see Thinking Fast and Slow, Daniel Kahneman, 2011.) 
Tucked away in the centre of the brain, System 1 monitors
the environment one way or another to minimize risk to sur-
vival and maximize reward. Feedback continually updates the
system about the environment. The emotional response system
evaluates all the incoming sensory information, and then scores
it for a ‘winner-takes-all’ competition to decide on the best
response. My contention in this article is that System 1 inter-
acting with incoming sensory information runs everything.
There is no room for any homunculus here. 
The details of the process are intriguing. All incoming sense
data are converted into a ‘common cerebral currency’, placed
into context, assessed for their predicted risk or reward value in
the emotional brain, and the likely error of that assessment. The
results are then ranked in what I have dubbed emotion scores, to
allow disparate information to be compared until a successful
competitor for stimulating a response emerges within the
system. This decision and choice mechanism is quantitatively
quite precise (see my On Stress Disease and Evolution: A Unifying
Theory, 2012, to see just how precise: eprints.utas.edu.au/12671/). 
Not a bad start? Then welcome to the world of System 1.
But of course you will now go and spoil things by asking:
‘What about the capacity for rational thought? Can that be
accommodated within this way of thinking?’ 
Well, actually, yes it can, but in a rather complex way. 
The Rational Brain
It is now clear that the two systems for decision-making in
man operate so-called ‘dual process monitoring’ (see for
instance De Neys and Glumicic in Cognition Vol. 106, 2008). I
see the mechanism for this dual processing being as follows. If
at any time a certain threshold for alerting System 1 is not
exceeded, judgement is withheld, and the more deliberative,
rational System 2 may come into play. Nonetheless, the intu-
itive, emotional system still tends to strongly dominate. De
Neys and Glumicic have found that subjects struggle to over-
ride the instinctive emotional risk/reward brain responses, since
rational thought options often do not receive enough cerebral
‘weight’ to prevail over the choices of the emotional brain. 
My suggestion for how to understand that is as follows. The
emotional brain always harvests the best option for response as
the one having the highest risk/reward emotion score, whether
this score is derived primarily from the emotional brain, or indirectly
via the rational brain. If nothing above a certain threshold is pro-
duced from the primary analysis of the incoming sensory infor-
mation by the emotional system, then analysis is switched to the
slower deliberations of the rational system. But – and here’s the
rub – the eventual risk/reward score calculated is not estimated
primarily through a ‘rational ranking’, but rather, is based on the
“Recently I was trying to explain to an intelligent woman the problem of
trying to understand how it is we perceive anything at all, and I was not
having any success. She could not see why there was a problem. Finally in
despair I asked her how she herself thought she saw the world. She replied
that she probably had somewhere in her head something like a little televi-
sion set. ‘So who,’ I asked ‘is looking at it?’ She now saw the problem
immediately.” F.H. Crick, in Scientific American, 1979
The first question to be answered is: Who or what is run-ning the show? In Part 1 I will attempt to explainhuman decision-making without the need for a hidden
homunculus. Part 2 will then go on to look at how the brain can
operate within this environment to generate the impression of
an individual being driven by a highly conscious self. 
The arguments over what has become known as the ‘mind-
body problem’ go back at least to René Descartes’ Seventeenth
Century dualist view that there’s ‘mind stuff’ and ‘body stuff’
and the two are quite separate, the mind stuff being ethereal.
In the face of all the neuroscience data accumulated since
Descartes’ time, I view this as a truly embarrassing stance to
take in the Twenty-First Century, so the first part of this arti-
cle will be concerned with seeing if we can get around it. I
think we can. My approach is a tad autocratic and the conclu-
sion equally radical, so be warned. 
Let’s look first look at how the brain makes its decisions. 
Part 1: DECISIONS
There are two major ways of processing information facili-
tated by the human brain. I hold that all decisions are made by a
risk/reward comparison of the incoming sensory information
within the emotional brain (‘System 1 thinking’) rather than
within the rational brain (‘System 2 thinking’). System 1, the
emotional system for processing sensory information and gen-
erating responses to it according to a risk or reward weighting,
is automatic, intuitive, and fast, even impulsive. System 2 is the
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risk/reward value of that response to the emotional brain. More-
over, because of the way the brain works, the emotional score of
rational deliberations is likely to often be less than rating from
any analysis primarily through the emotional system. In effect
then: Rational options are chosen if and only if the emotion scores they
evoke in the evaluation of the emotional brain are high enough to beat
the scores of any more intuitive competitor responses. 
The situation here is complex. It takes time and trouble to
allocate emotional risk/reward scores to rational system
response options so that they can compete in the emotional
brain. Actually, given the magnitude and complexity of the task
involved, the wonder is that rational options ever manage to get
converted into having competitive emotional risk/reward scores
at all. All that the rational system would have to go on would be
past experience; and at best, that would merely be analogous to
any present situation rather than precisely the same – meaning
that the process of converting rational options to emotional
risk/reward options will often lead to an underestimation of
their persuasiveness. By contrast, the emotional brain has an
innate strength and creates correspondingly strong options
because of its long evolutionary history of development to aid
survival. This system is not easily overcome. This would
explain why deliberations about rational options often carry less
‘weight’. In effect, System 2 is generally less ‘assertive’. It is also
circumspect, and lazy (see Kahneman, p.44). 
The upshot of all this is that if any assessment of any situation
by the emotional brain scores above threshold at first pass, it
decides the response without deliberation being required. But if
not, an option on the same information through the rational
mode of thought can still occasionally win on being converted
back to a emotional brain score. Its emotional score can improve
with experience and training to eventually prevail in specific
cases. This is what learning logic is all about. For example, once
it has learned the value of Venn diagrams in solving some logic
problems, the rational brain can use Venn diagram thinking in
others. So the rational brain may be less assertive, but aspects of
it may be more trainable than emotional brain processes, caus-
ing them to eventually dominate and be preferred in particular
cases. However I hold that, in the end, they will be useful in
reaching decisions only if they have enough ‘appeal’ in the emo-
tional brain to outbid their more intuitive rivals. Put another
way – whether we like it or not, we choose rational options only
insofar as they are judged to be potentially more emotionally
rewarding than their intuitive rivals – in essence, only if our
rational deliberations ‘feel’ better. (Of course, rational options
can be of value in making decisions even when they merely
inform the intuitive decision-making process.) 
Let’s take a breath, because this point about the emotion
scoring of rational options is not easy, and I want to make sure
it is grasped. The whole emotion scoring system I’ve described
I see as being eventually based entirely on the long-established
evolutionarily-derived intuitive, risk-reward emotional infor-
mation-processing system 1. Everything would be a lot simpler
if options could be ranked for their rationality, and then
allowed to compete directly with intuitive options from the
emotional system. But that is not how it works: the only scor-
ing system available is that based on the emotional responses
evoked within the risk/reward system, so options arising from
the rational system need to have their rational scores converted
to emotional scores before they can compete. In the situations
described, they occasionally do; but overall, “the emotional tail
wags the rational dog” (Kahneman, p.140). Incidentally, there
is no reason to think that any of this evaluation need be carried
out at a conscious level. 
Autonomy of Decision-Making
All this bears directly on the question: ‘Can the whole
system run autonomously – that is, with our responses, even
our thoughts, being determined entirely by the sensory input
interacting with the emotional brain?’ 
Indeed it can. The brain has no need of any homunculus or
remote-control television viewer to drive it. And that is by far
and away the most important conclusion I have to offer here. 
So how come it all looks so much otherwise – so much as if
we are in control of our reactions as conscious selves? Let me
now try to convince you that the self is an artificial construct –
that self-consciousness is the product of the brain interacting
with incoming information in the way I’ve just discussed, and
that all this together gives the false impression of primary con-
sciousness with an active self in charge. 
Part 2: CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE SELF
Following Benjamin Libet’s seminal studies (originally pub-
lished in Behavioral & Brain Sciences Vol.8, 1985), it is clear that
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consciousness is late on the scene of any brain activity. This
means that consciousness is an epiphenomenon: it is produced
by brain activity, but does not itself influence brain activity.
Given this, I suggest that final decisions from the brain are
simply fed into a construct we call the self. 
All gets a bit complicated here, so let’s look at the self first. 
The Self 
There are generally held to be two sorts of selves: the
bodily self, or ‘self-as-object’; and the first-person self, the
‘inner I’, the 'self-as-subject’– supposedly the self in active
charge of everything – meaning that the individual experiences
that the highest linguistic deliberations of the brain are
referred for output to this inner self-construct ‘as if’ to an
active self-as-subject. However, I suggest that this first person
self-as-subject construct is not at all actively in charge of voli-
tion, attention and decision-making in the way we experience
and so profoundly believe it to be. Instead, culture, especially
language, play a large part both in this self’s development and
in our illusion that it has control. 
The way I see everything developing is as follows. 
As the child matures and gets a grasp of language, society
expects her to be accountable for her actions – a controlling
‘self-as-subject.’ But there is no such active self controlling
everything: the brain’s conscious output is determined entirely
by the competitive risk/reward emotion-scoring system(s) I
described. Above this, there remains only the individual with
her passive inner self-construct – that is her experience of
being a self that has been created through other brain activity.
Nonetheless, given social pressure, the child must respond
‘appropriately’. She does so in the only way she can – by
unwittingly allowing her passive inner self-construct be
formed as if it were the active self in charge. Again though, the
apparently active nature of this newly deemed ‘self-as-subject’
is illusory. There is no inner active self driving thought and
behaviour – just a passive inner self-construct to which all of
the higher brain’s language-based output (including ‘rational
choice’) is referred for ‘ownership’ to make it seem that there
is, and in the process satisfy social expectations. 
Self-Consciousness
From this I also suggest that the acquisition of language
skills is vital for establishing yet another layer of higher human
brain functioning – self-consciousness. 
For a human being to achieve her maximum potential
awareness of the outside world, she must learn the language
skills of her cultural group. This gives her a highly sophisti-
cated means of processing information to understand and
describe the world – including names for various entities and a
grasp of the value of models and metaphors in coming to terms
with difficult new concepts. 
Once the sense of self-as-subject has been constructed, the
individual is in possession of a robust (if false) sense of an
active inner ‘I’. It then becomes natural for this construct to
appear to own the language-based higher brain output too. I
suggest that when this happens, that brain’s output becomes
what we call ‘self-conscious’ and the illusion is complete: it
then appears certain to us that we are a true active inner self in
charge of the stream of consciousness – the very homunculus
watching and controlling the television screen. Self-conscious-
ness is thus seen here as being essentially an emergent feature
of the grounding of all language-based higher-brain output in
the self-as-subject. It is a state of awareness of the world so
heightened over that of non-linguistic creatures that it is
deemed to warrant the distinct term ‘self-consciousness’. The
more that society and the world are experienced and learned
over time via such communication, the more self-conscious-
ness each individual attains. Yet from this perspective, neither
self-consciousness nor the self-as-subject plays any role in the
creation of thought. They are entirely secondary, non-causal
phenomena resulting from higher brain activity – the effect
and not the cause of the way the world becomes known, of
how the individual comes to be ‘with knowledge’ (con-scious). 
All this is not to say that those without language are not con-
scious in some way. It’s just that I see self-consciousness as a state
of awareness so heightened by language that it deserves to be
distinguished from it. By this reckoning, animal awareness could
include a lower level of consciousness. Also, the more communi-
cation an individual masters, the more awareness - and eventu-
ally self-consciousness – is attained. It’s all a matter of degree. 
These, then, are my views. 
Challenging? Well, that’s the whole point. 
Conclusion
The brain makes its decisions via its emotion-scoring
risk/reward system interacting with sensory input from the
environment, with its outputs being much less rational than we
think. Inputs from the rational system occasionally receive suf-
ficiently high ‘emotion scores’ to successfully compete. This
system has no need of any mysterious Cartesian mind to drive
it. The self and self-consciousness are both passive constructs,
although society’s interaction with the individual determines
that they come to be viewed otherwise. So that’s it – all with
apologies to Descartes, of course. 
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